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Bang And Olufsen A8 Manual [Unlimited EBook]
The aircraft's twin-engine configuration, seat capacity of 185-230 seats, and range capability of up to 6,200nm have been the main factors in its success. This guide provides a comprehensive review of its variants and their specifications, modification programmes, fuel burn performance and maintenance costs. It is best suited to medium- to long-haul distances. It offers outstanding operational efficiency with a good payload configuration. The stretch version, the 300 series, provides for yet higher payload capability. By clicking “Agree”, you agree to our use of cookies. To learn more about how we use cookies, please see our cookies policy. Air Partner services are provided in accordance with 14 CFR Part 295 requirements. We’ve made big changes to make the eCFR easier to use. Be sure to leave feedback using the 'Feedback' button on the bottom right of each page!The Public Inspection page may alsoWhile every effort has been made to ensure thatUntil the ACFR grants it official status, the XMLCounts are subject to sampling, reprocessing and revision (up or down) throughout the day. This information is not part of the official Federal Register document. Use the PDF linked in the document sidebar for the official electronic format. These can be usefulOnly official editions of theUse the PDF linked in the document sidebar for the official electronic format. That AD currently requires inspections to detect cracking or corrosion of the fail-safe straps between the side fitting of the rear spar bulkhead at body station 955 and the skin; and follow-on and corrective actions. This new AD expands the applicability; and adds an inspection for cracking in the fail-safe strap, and repair or replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by additional reports of cracks in 51 fail-safe straps on 41 airplanes; we have also received a report of a crack found in the “T” fitting that connects the fail-safe strap to the outboard edge of the pressure deck.
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We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking or corrosion of the fail-safe straps and the “T” fittings, which could result in cracking of adjacent structure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the fuselage. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. That AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 24, 2011 ( 76 FR 10288 ). That NPRM proposed to continue to require inspections to detect cracking or corrosion of the fail-safe straps between the side fitting of the rear spar bulkhead at body station 955 and the skin; and follow-on and corrective actions. That NPRM also proposed to expand the applicability, and add an inspection for cracking in the fail-safe strap, and repair or replacement if necessary. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and the FAA's response to each comment. APB stated that it completed an analysis of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 2, dated January 15, 2010, and determined that the defined rework limits are valid when winglets are installed. APB added that including these airplanes will reduce the effort to support requests for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) to the NPRM. We received an analysis package from APB which verifies that the compliance information included in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 2, dated January 15, 2010, is adequate to provide an acceptable level of safety for airplanes equipped with those winglets.
Those airplanes are listed in the effectivity section of Revision 2 of this service bulletin, which is identified in the applicability section of this AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard. However, since the referenced STC does not affect accomplishment of the requirements of this AD, we have clarified that an AMOC is not necessary for these airplanes by adding this provision in new Note 1 to paragraph (c) of this AD. We have also reidentified subsequent notes. However, since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the final rule, no change to the AD has been made in this regard. Boeing noted that the proposed actions are for detecting and repairing corrosion or cracking of the fail-safe straps. Boeing stated that the inspections are intended only to increase damage detection prior to installation of a kept “T” fitting. Some “T” fitting cracks have been reported since issuance of the existing AD, as noted in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 2, dated January 15, 2010; therefore, the “T” fitting is part of the unsafe condition. We have not changed this AD in this regard. CAL stated that paragraph (k) of the NPRM requires that the corrosion on the fail-safe straps be repaired in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 2, dated January 15, 2010. CAL added that paragraph 3.B.7 of the Accomplishment Instructions specifies that if corrosion is found on the fail-safe straps, it should be removed as given in Chapter 51-10-02 of the Boeing 767 Structural Repair Manual (SRM). CAL noted that it did not find any information pertaining to the fail-safe straps when reviewing the SRM for the correct rework limits. CAL believes the corrosion removal instructions are incomplete.
That chapter contains general procedures for repairing corrosion (which apply to the fail-safe straps), which include inspection, repair, and rework limits but does not contain specific procedures for removing corrosion from fail-safe straps. That revision removes the reference to the SRM in Step 3.B.7., and instead specifies to contact Boeing for repair instructions. Therefore we have revised paragraph (k) of this AD to specify that where Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, specifies to contact Boeing for repair, this AD requires repair using a method approved in accordance with paragraph (o) of this AD. These changes include revising a Standard Operating Practices Manual (SOPM) reference to specify SOPM 20-20-00, adding a fastener code to Figure 28 that was omitted, and revising cable identification labels in Figures 32 and 34. We have revised this AD to refer to Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, as the appropriate source of service information for accomplishing the required actions. We have added Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 2, dated January 15, 2010, to paragraph (n) of this AD to give credit for doing actions before the effective date of this AD, using that revision. CAL stated that the standard operating manual reference specified in the resistance check of bonding fasteners during the panel installation does not provide the maximum resistance value. CAL stated that the control cable turnbuckle body station locations are reversed. The actions specified in the SOPM and those figures are only referred to in the service bulletin for optional guidance. As stated previously, Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, corrects these errors. We have made no change to the AD in this regard. We have determined that these minor changes: Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator.
Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. FAA-2011-0044; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-059-AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01920SE is installed, a “change in product” alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17. For all other AMOC requests, the operator must request approval for an AMOC according to paragraph (o) of this AD. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking or corrosion of the fail-safe straps and the “T” fittings, which could result in cracking of adjacent structure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the fuselage. As of the effective date of this AD, use only Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012. Doing the inspections required by paragraph (i) of this AD terminates the requirements of this paragraph. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate procedures may be required.” For airplanes identified in paragraph (g) of this AD on which the fail-safe strap has been replaced before November 1, 2004: Do the actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD within 12,000 flight cycles after accomplishing the replacement. Step 2 also should state “Open Main Landing Gear (MLG) doors” instead of “Open Main Landing Green (MLG) doors.
” If no crack or corrosion is found, repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight cycles or 36 months, whichever occurs first. Accomplishing the actions required by this paragraph ends the requirements of paragraphs (g) and (g)(1) of this AD. Do all applicable related investigative actions before further flight. If no crack is found, repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight cycles or 36 months, whichever occurs first. Accomplishing the fail-safe strap trim repair in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, ends the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD only on the side of the airplane where the repair was done. Replacing the fail-safe strap with a replacement strap that has the revised edge configuration in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, ends the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD only on the side of the airplane where the replacement was done. Repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight cycles or 36 months, whichever occurs first. Replacing the fail-safe strap with a replacement strap that has the revised edge configuration in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-53A0100, Revision 3, dated February 6, 2012, ends the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD only on the side of the airplane where the replacement was done. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD.For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane and 14 CFR 25.571, Amendment 45, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) under 5 U.S.C.
552 (a) and 1 CFR part 51 of the following service information on the date specified. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to. We’ve made big changes to make the eCFR easier to use. Be sure to leave feedback using the 'Feedback' button on the bottom right of each page!The Public Inspection page may alsoWhile every effort has been made to ensure thatUntil the ACFR grants it official status, the XMLCounts are subject to sampling, reprocessing and revision (up or down) throughout the day. Use the PDF linked in the document sidebar for the official electronic format. These can be usefulUse the PDF linked in the document sidebar for the official electronic format. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent ignition of fuel vapors due to the generation of sparks, to prevent a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank caused by steel-to-steel contact during dry fuel pump operation, and to ensure satisfactory fuel pump and fuel system operation. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. The action proposed to continue to require revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include procedures that will ensure that the center tank fuel pumps are not operated with less than 1,000 pounds of fuel in the center tank. Additionally, the action proposed to require installation of a new configuration center tank fuel pump, which would terminate the AFM revisions regarding fuel system operating procedures and repetitive inspection requirements. Since the issuance of the proposed rule, the FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletins 767-28-0062 and 767-28-0063, both dated December 20, 2000.
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-28-0063 provides procedures for installing a placard for the wing fueling station to advise that use of JP-4 or Jet B fuel in the center fuel tank is prohibited. The FAA has approved incorporation of these service bulletins as an acceptable means of compliance with paragraph (i) of this AD, and has added a new note, Note 5, to this final rule to acknowledge this means of compliance. Due consideration has been given to the comments received. The commenter states that the pump configuration with a cast-in diffuser is the only approved configuration for Model 767-400ER series airplanes.The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request to list the applicability of the AD in terms of airplanes equipped with certain part numbers. Thus, the FAA finds it necessary to make this AD applicable to all Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. Thus, the applicability of this AD has been revised to exclude all Model 767-400ER series airplanes. The FAA has revised paragraph (f) of this final rule to specify that, for airplanes equipped with a center tank scavenge system on which the center fuel tank is deactivated, the pump replacement specified by paragraph (i) of this AD is not required. Several commenters request an increase in the compliance time to 60 months, while one commenter suggests a compliance time of 48 months. The commenters' reasons include the facts that a sufficient quantity of replacement parts will not be available in the proposed 24-month compliance period, and overhaul facilities will be unable to complete the work on the affected fleet of airplanes within that timeframe. Related to the request to extend the compliance time for the requirements of paragraph (i) of the proposed AD, one additional commenter asks that, if the compliance time for paragraph (i) cannot be extended beyond 24 months, the requirement be removed from this AD and issued as a separate action.
At the same time, the FAA has determined that the combination of inspections and revised flight crew procedures required by this AD will be adequate to ensure an acceptable level of safety for the affected airplanes during the 36-month compliance time. The FAA has revised paragraph (i) of this AD accordingly. Therefore, the FAA has also revised paragraphs (g) and (h) of this AD accordingly. No change is necessary in this regard. Based on information received from the manufacturer, the FAA has determined that a sufficient quantity of replacement parts will be available within the 36-month compliance time for paragraph (i) of this final rule. However, if the commenter wants more information on the supply plan, the pump manufacturer may be able to provide this information. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The commenters correctly note that paragraph (d) doesn't specify an inspection. Therefore, no change to the final rule has been made in this regard. The commenter states that the total number of affected airplanes in the worldwide fleet is 784, and the total number of these affected airplanes on the U.S. registry is 325. The FAA concurs with the commenter's request and has revised the cost impact section accordingly. As stated previously, incorporation of both Boeing Service Bulletins 767-28-0062 and 767-28-0063 is approved as a method of compliance with paragraph (i) of this AD. The FAA has revised the Cost Impact section of this final rule to include information from those service bulletins. The commenter states that the cost, terms, and conditions associated with installation of any new parts required by this AD will be addressed separately from this AD. The FAA concurs with the commenter's request, and has revised the Cost Impact section of this final rule accordingly. The FAA infers that the commenter is referring to paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of this AD. However, the FAA finds that further clarification can be made.
No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. Credit is always given for actions accomplished before the effective date of an AD by means of the phrase in the “Compliance” statement of the AD: “Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.” The commenter states that removing this statement will clarify this requirement because if a fuel tank is deactivated, it doesn't matter if the airplane has a center tank scavenge transfer system with respect to doing the inspections in paragraph (e) of this AD. The FAA acknowledges that the center tank may only be deactivated if the airplane is equipped with a center tank scavenge system, so the reference in paragraph (f) may seem redundant. However, the FAA finds that there is no technical inaccuracy in paragraph (f), nor is the requirement unclear; thus, no change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The commenter states that it is confusing to have a compliance time of 14 days after October 2, 1997, because that date has passed. The commenter notes that this is especially confusing in light of the addition of paragraph (c) to this AD. The purpose of carrying over the compliance time for the requirements of AD 97-19-15 is to ensure that the requirement for revising the AFM is continued without interruption. Paragraph (c) of this AD simply adds alternative wording for the AFM revision previously required by paragraph (b) of AD 97-19-15, but paragraph (b) is still acceptable for compliance. Referring to the October 2, 1997, effective date of AD 97-19-15 also ensures that any airplanes already in compliance with that AD do not have to comply again with paragraph (b) or (c) of this AD. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. Paragraph (a) of this AD allows accomplishment of either paragraph (b) or (c) of the AD, and paragraph (b) differs from paragraph (c) of this AD in that (b)(1) contains essentially the same wording as suggested by the commenter.
However, if the commenter finds it necessary to use words other than those given in paragraph (b) or (c), it may submit a request for approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) under paragraph (n) of this AD. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The commenter states that the two paragraphs have identical wording and there is no distinction as to differences in the airplane models to which each paragraph applies. The wording of the AFM revisions specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)(1) are slightly different, as discussed above. Paragraph (c)(1) was added in this AD to allow operators an alternative to revising the AFM with the wording in paragraph (b)(1). No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The commenter states that such a compliance time would permit both the initial and repetitive inspections required by paragraph (e) to be performed during regular scheduled maintenance visits, thus allowing operators to avoid operational difficulties associated with unscheduled maintenance visits. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this action, the FAA considered not only the degree of urgency associated with addressing the identified unsafe condition, but also the manufacturer's recommendation of a 60-day compliance time, and the practical aspects of performing the inspections at intervals that parallel regular scheduled maintenance for the majority of affected operators. The FAA finds that there is no technical justification for an extension of this compliance time; thus no change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The commenter bases its request on the fact that it has not found any discrepancies since it started the repetitive inspections two years ago. The commenter notes that inspecting one side per “A” check will reduce the chance for “dual sided mistakes.
” The commenter also states that extending the repetitive interval will reduce the potential for damage to the fuel pumps, O-rings, and other parts due to being subjected to repetitive inspections. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this action, the FAA considered not only the degree of urgency associated with addressing the identified unsafe condition, but also the manufacturer's recommendation for a repetitive interval, and the practical aspects of performing the inspections at intervals that parallel regular scheduled maintenance for the majority of affected operators.Should the operator wish to gain approval for use of an alternate inspection schedule that provides an equivalent level of safety, the operator may submit a request for approval of an AMOC under paragraph (n) of this AD. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. In addition, the FAA notes that details are minimized in the summary of AD actions, thus the FAA does not consider it necessary to incorporate this level of detail in the summary of this AD. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard. The FAA inadvertently omitted a reference to Model 767-300F series airplanes in that paragraph. Therefore, for clarification, the FAA has revised paragraph (d) of this final rule to state that the paragraph applies to certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD. The FAA estimates that 325 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD. As stated previously, since the issuance of the NPRM, the FAA has approved incorporation of Boeing Service Bulletins 767-28-0062 and 767-28-0063 as an acceptable means of accomplishing this action.The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD.
These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES. Docket 98-NM-226-AD. Supersedes AD 97-19-15, Amendment 39-10136. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. For airplanes not equipped with a center tank scavenge system, this 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms) of center tank fuel must be considered unusable. Fuel transfer begins when the main tanks are approximately half empty.” This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. Following accomplishment of the requirements of these paragraphs, the AFM revisions required by paragraph (b) of this AD may be removed from the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. For airplanes not equipped with a center tank scavenge system, this 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms) of center tank fuel must be considered unusable. Fuel transfer begins when the main tanks are approximately half empty.” This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM.
This may be accomplished by viewing the pitch inclinometer, located in the left main gear wheel well. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 flight hours. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.” As of 36 months after the effective date of this AD, modified fuel pumps must be installed according to paragraph (i) of this AD before the center fuel tank may be reactivated. The installation shall be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. We recommend you upgrade to a newer version of Internet Explorer or switch to a browser like Firefox or Chrome. The fire was located in the supernumerary compartment of the airplane. This compartment, which is present on some cargo airplanes, is located directly aft of the cockpit and forward of the main deck cargo compartment which is where the toilet, galley, and three non-flight crew seats are located (see diagram below).The flight crew evacuated the aircraft through the flight deck windows and were not injured, but the aircraft was substantially fire damaged and later classified as a hull loss.
The fire was located in the supernumerary compartment of the airplane. This compartment, which is present on some cargo airplanes, is located directly aft of the cockpit and forward of the main deck cargo compartment which is where the toilet, galley, and three non-flight crew seats are located (see diagram below).The flight crew evacuated the aircraft through the flight deck windows and were not injured, but the aircraft was substantially fire damaged and later classified as a hull loss. The Investigation further concluded that the design of the oxygen hose assembly allowed its internal spring to become a source of ignition when it was electrically energised, the PVC hose material to act as a fuel and the oxygen within the hose to promote burning. The means by which the spring became energised was sought by examination of other Boeing 767s in the Operator’s fleet. These inspections found electrical wiring in contact with or routed near to stainless steel oxygen supply tubing. A short circuit from this close-contact wiring was considered to be the most likely source of electrical energy to the spring. No direct evidence of a short circuit on the accident aircraft, i.e. no beading on wires or arc marks on the oxygen supply tubing, could be found, but most of the wiring near the supply tubing and portions of the tubing was missing.The lack of positive separation allowed a short circuit to breach a combustible oxygen hose, release oxygen, and initiate a fire in the supernumerary compartment that rapidly spread to other areas. Contributing to this accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s ( Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ) failure to require the installation of nonconductive oxygen hoses after the safety issue concerning conductive hoses was initially identified by Boeing.”. The airliner was launched as the 7X7 project on July 14, 1978, the prototype first flew on September 26, 1981, and it was certified on July 30, 1982.
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